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The Great War and
Canadian Memory, Part 2
Editor’s note: In the spring 2000 issue, the CMH Book Review Supplement published a review essay by Professor Robert Martin, Professor
of Law at The University of Western Ontario, on recent works on the
history of the First World War. In this essay, Professor Martin offers
some reflections on the current state of the historiography, in light of
new publications.

T

A. The Great War

hanks to what I referred to earlier as the “perennial fascination” with the Great War, the flood
of books and writing about the war
continues unabated. Terry Castle,
who seems to be as addicted to
reading books about the Great War
as I am, has recently written a superb essay exploring this phenomenon. “In my experience,” she
writes, “just about any book dealing with the First World War is
worth reading. The subject has traditionally inspired eloquence, brilliance, even nobility in its chroniclers.”1 How is it possible that a
war which ended eighty-six years
ago can exert such a hold on the
collective imagination? The answer
is simple. The Great War was the
defining event of the twentieth century, “the war that shaped the world
in which we still live.”2 Some his-

torians have recently taken to referring to something called “the
short twentieth century,” which
started with the outbreak of the
Great War in August 1914 and
ended with the destruction of the
Berlin Wall in November 1989 – the
act that represented the final apotheosis of the chain of events set in
motion in 1914.3
The striking and remarkable
thing about recent books on the
Great War is their consistently revisionist perspective. Recent work
aggressively rejects received views
of the war. As Ralph Peters says
about Hew Strachan’s work, “this
isn’t another all-the-generals-wereincompetent knock-off about the
Great War, pursuing the ghost of
Wilfred Owen through the muddy
sorrows of the Western Front.”4
Another commentator on Strachan
has suggested that “his desire is to
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take the cliché image of the war,
particularly the English one – the
war as Monty Python massacre with
idiot Graham Chapman generals
sending gormless Michael Palin
soldiers to a senseless death – and
replace it with something more like
the image that Americans have of
our Civil War: a horrible, hard slog,
certainly, but fought for a cause in
itself essentially good.”5
One theme which runs through
recent writing about the Great War
is that the generals were not the
brutal, incompetent butchers they
have often been portrayed to be in
what might be called, after Stanley
Kubrick’s movie of 1957, the Paths
of Glory view of the war. One exception to this historiography of the
late 1950s and early 1960s was a
profoundly unconvincing monograph, John Terraine’s Douglas
Haig: The Educated Soldier. It was
no easy task for a British historian
to attempt in 1963 to rehabilitate
Haig’s generalship and to suggest
that the victory of 1918 was the logical and, possibly, intended outcome
of the battles of 1916 and 1917.
The contemporary view, while
it does not go as far as Terraine
did in 1963, seems to be that the
generals, confronted with near impossible conditions, did the best
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they could. 6 Sound generalship
largely depends on what we would
call today “command and control.”
On the twentieth-century battlefield
the key to command and control
was communications.7 In the Great
War effective communications did
not exist. As John Keegan has noted,
“contemporary wireless sets, dependent on sources of energy too
large and heavy to be useful
militarily outside warships, were
not practicable tools of command
in the field.”8 The only practical
alternative was the telephone which,
of course, depends on line. By 1916
telephone lines were normally buried six feet deep. On the artilleryravaged battlefield of the Great
War, even lines that had been buried six feet would be cut. With the
telephones out of order, the only
practical means of communication
was the runner. In an infantry attack, it could take six or eight hours
for a sitrep from the leading battalions to get back to divisional HQ,
and another six or eight hours for
fresh orders to go forward. What,
other than disaster, could have been
expected? As Keegan says, by the
time of the Allied offensives of
1918, lessons had been learned and
telephone lines were commonly
buried eight feet deep, thereby making a degree of command and control possible (313).
A further received opinion
about British generals is that they
were all, or nearly all, dim-witted
cavalry officers who kept themselves well out of harm’s way and
supplied with “distant chateaux,
well-polished entourages, glittering
motor cars, cavalry escorts, regular routines, heavy dinners and
uninterrupted hours of sleep.” 9
Recent work systematically revises
this view. Robin Neillands demonstrated that only a minority of British generals came from the cavalry,
and dismissed the notion that generals should not have been far from
the front: “Can it be seriously maintained that an officer commanding
half a million or a million men
should scribble out his orders on
a notebook while kneeling in a front
line trench?” (16-17). Keegan
pointed out that fifty-six British

generals were killed in action,
twenty-two of these by small arms
fire (312). Possibly the only British
general who conformed to the stereotype was fictional: Lieutenant-General Curzon, the central character
of C.S. Forester’s 1936 novel The
General. Curzon was an undeniably
dim-witted cavalryman, but he was
seriously wounded, losing his legs
to an artillery shell during the German offensive of 1918.
The war that emerges from contemporary writing looks quite a bit
different from the war which, thirty
years ago, seemed to have become
irrevocably fixed. Standard books
about the war invariably included
a discussion of the 1917 “mutinies”
in the French army. John Keegan
has effectively and convincingly
demolished the myth of the mutiny.
His argument is that, while there
were acts of indiscipline in the
French army in 1917, these are best
understood as industrial action,
rather than as mutiny (329). It
seems to be generally agreed that,
of all the armies on the Western
Front, the French was the worstmanaged. The better view of 1917
is that French soldiers, fed up with
bad food, poor pay, an execrable
medical service, and wretched
leave arrangements, simply downed
tools.10 This may seem an excessively nice distinction. Many would
certainly argue that “industrial action” by front-line soldiers in an
army at war must equal mutiny.
Terry Castle seems to have suggested that there is no such thing
as a bad book about the Great War.
John Mosier’s The Myth of the
Great War: A New Military History
of World War I (New York: Perennial, 2002) is deeply revisionist, but
is also a very bad book. As he put
it, “the great myth of the war, then,
is that Great Britain and France
won it” (9). As far as I understand
it, Mosier’s thesis is that Britain
and France had lying, incompetent
governments and lying, incompetent generals. It was, in his view,
the United States which defeated
Germany. He consistently and systematically attacks the British
Army. If John Wayne had ever written a book about the Great War, this

2
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would have been it. The only element in the British Expeditionary
Force [BEF] about which Mosier
has anything good to say is the Canadians. He observed that “Canada’s record in the Great War was
one of distinction” (7), and described Sir Arthur Currie as “possibly the best Allied general of the
war” (102). I have read an enormous
amount about the Great War. Until
Mosier, I had not encountered a
writer who questioned the fighting
qualities of the British soldier.
Mosier did this at length (317).
Everyone who knows anything
about the Great War is familiar with
Erich Ludendorff ’s characterization of the British Army as “lions
led by donkeys.” The caricature we
get from Mosier is “pussy-cats led
by donkeys.”
The one interesting and original feature of Mosier’s work is the
way he attributes many British failures to defective equipment. He
takes some pains to establish that
the majority of battlefield casualties on the Western Front were
caused by artillery, as opposed to
small-arms, fire (2).11 Mosier deduced from this simple fact that the
quality of artillery pieces and the
skill of their organization and utilization would determine success
or failure on the battlefields of the
Western Front. He argued that the
British artillery pieces and the way
they were used were both inferior
(31-46).
The primary British field artillery piece, although many calibres
were in common use by 1916, was
the 18-pounder (84 mm) gun. The
18-pounder had a single pole trail,
one unfortunate result of which was
that the weapon could be elevated
only slightly. As a gun, rather than
a howitzer, the 18-pounder was
designed to be fired in a flat trajectory. Being used primarily in a direct-fire role, the 18-pounder was
strikingly ineffective against an entrenched enemy. The British attachment to shrapnel shells further
weakened the 18-pounder’s effectiveness. Shrapnel shells were filled
with metal balls which sprayed
forth when the shell detonated.
Shrapnel was ideal for colonial
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wars, being most effective against
tightly-bunched troops in the open,
but was of limited effectiveness
against well dug-in troops. Firing
shrapnel shells over a flat trajectory at an enemy protected by
barbed wire and trenches was next
to useless, as was evidenced by
20,000 dead British infantrymen on
1 July 1916. The attachment to
shrapnel meant that British gunners
used few high-explosive shells.
When one considers the absurdly
high proportion of British shells
which were duds, it becomes even
clearer why it took four years of
war before the British began to enjoy success on the battlefield.
Mosier also argues that the way
British artillery was organized was
inferior to the German practice. He
notes that, in the German Army,
control over heavy artillery was
granted to officers lower down in
the hierarchy than was the case in
the British army.
Mosier is also critical of the
major British innovation in equipment during the war, the tank.12 The
tank was designed to overcome two
major tactical problems on the
Western Front. First, since No
Man’s Land was swept by artillery
and small arms fire, getting an infantry soldier across alive and able
to fight was close to impossible.
Second, since No Man’s Land was
made up largely of mud and shell
holes, it could not be crossed by a
wheeled vehicle. Thus, a tracked
armoured vehicle seemed to be the
answer. Early British tanks failed
for two reasons: they were too
lightly armoured to protect their
crews against small arms and mortar fire, and they tended to get stuck
and become immobilized. For
Mosier, these deficiencies were the
result of a fundamental flaw in the
design of British tanks. The engines
in British tanks were too small to
enable them to move effectively
across No Man’s Land and to be
covered with sufficient armour to
protect their crews (239). In fact, it
might be said that early British
tanks were hampered by the fact
that few of the mechanical components necessary to construct an effective tank even existed at the time.

Still, even if one accepts that
we are all revisionists now, I find it
difficult to expunge the traditional
view of Douglas Haig from my
mind. It seems to be generally
agreed that, by the end of 1917,
Lloyd George had lost confidence
in Haig as Commander of the BEF
and wished to remove him. Haig was
not removed, primarily because
Lloyd George feared that the political repercussions of sacking
Haig might cost him – Lloyd George
– his office.
Many decades after the event I
have a theory as to how Haig might
safely have been removed. This
would have involved reorganizing
the BEF. It was not a tactical formation; its primary raison d’être
seems to have been to have a British national army under a British
commander. Once Marshal Foch
had been installed as Allied Supreme Commander in the spring of
1918, this ceased to be such a pressing political goal. How might the
BEF have been reorganized? While
the French and the Germans used
the Army Group formation during
the Great War, the British did not.
For all practical purposes the BEF,
consisting as it did of five armies,
was a large Army Group.13 The BEF
could have been reorganized as two
army groups. At this point there
would be no need for a commander
of the BEF and Haig could have
been removed from overall command. It would then have been necessary to find two Army Group commanders, but who? Haig himself
would have been an obvious choice,
since he did actually have experience of commanding an Army
Group. The other choice would have
been Herbert Plumer, who was
clearly the best British Army commander. Mosier went so far as to
describe Plumer as “the only competent senior officer the B.E.F. had”
(283). In contrast to many British
generals, Plumer grasped that the
key to the Great War battlefield was
firepower, not manpower. He had a
policy, as Neillands puts it, of
“waste metal, not flesh” (374).
At the same time as we are
speculating about re-organizing the
BEF, the question of reorganizing
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the Canadian Corps may also be
addressed. By the second half of
1918, Canadian divisions were,
numerically, the strongest on the
Western Front. In 1914, British,
French, and German divisions all
included twelve battalions of infantry. Heavy casualties forced some
reorganization and, by mid-1918,
the standard division on the Western Front had been reduced to nine
battalions of infantry. The Canadian
Corps retained the twelve-battalion
division, so that, in total, it could
muster 48 battalions of infantry. We
should also remember that there
was a fifth Canadian division in
England. Thus, there were sixty
battalions of Canadian infantry on
the other side of the Atlantic. Sixty
battalions would have been sufficient to man six to seven nine-battalion divisions. It might well have
made sense to reorganize the CEF
as an army made up of two corps
with three divisions each (a six-division army would have been small,
but in the next war Canada did field
a five-division army). In 1918 the
British did urge such a reorganization, but the idea was strongly
resisted by the Canadians, especially by General Currie.

W

B. Canadian Memory

e will soon lose direct contact
with the Great War. Fewer than
ten Canadian veterans of the Great
War are alive today and, of course,
each of them is well over one hundred years old. This simple fact
means that, for our knowledge of
the Great War, we shall have to rely
henceforth on historians. Like all
academic disciplines in Canada, history has suffered greatly at the
hands of the devotees of post-modern theology. I have elsewhere described what masquerades as historical writing as “pseudo-history.”14 The overriding goal, as I see
it, of this pseudo-history is to paint
Canada’s past in the worst light
possible. The past is constantly
reinvented in order to make it conform to the demands of post-modern ideology. Martin Loney has been
critical of the practice of history in
Canada, describing what is taught
in universities as a “caricatured
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view of Canada.”15 Why has this
happened?
I believe that the nihilism which
inheres in post-modern thought16
has both demanded and justified
the abandonment of established
standards of historical methodology. Easily the most wretched example of pseudo-history is The
Valour and the Horror, produced
for the CBC in the 1990s by the
brothers McKenna. Certain RCAF
veterans were not pleased with the
suggestion in The Valour and the
Horror that they had been war criminals and sued the CBC for libel. The
action was dismissed on the basis
that none of the plaintiffs had been
identified with sufficient specificity
to be able to maintain a libel suit.
The Ontario Court of Appeal did
make certain observations about
the programme, taking note of “the
misplaced
emphases,
the
caricaturish portrayals of some of
the strategists, the inaccuracy of
some of the detail, and the omission of some of the countervailing
considerations in the film.”17 It
does seem to me that the stock in
trade of the CBC is shoddy work.18
As I see it, the other pillar of
post-modern is solipsism. A central element of current solipsistic
thinking is a belief that each individual is entitled to make up his or
her own version of the universe.19
Such a belief can have a destructive effect on the writing of history.
Laurel T. Ulrich, a professor at
Harvard, was recently quoted as
stating “We need to have a little bit
of humility to recognize people can
do what they want to with the
past.”20
To what length can this be
taken? There is another work of
pseudo-history which gives us a
clue. This is Canada: A People’s
History, another television series by
the CBC that was eventually published in book form, in two volumes. The second volume, by Don
Gillmor, Achille Michaud, and
Pierre
Turgeon
(Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 2001),
contains a chapter which purports
to discuss the Great War. (The book
is also notable, or notorious, for
featuring, as its cover illustration,

a photograph of an Australian soldier.) The author of this chapter
enthusiastically lists every possible
example that can make Canada and
Canadians look bad. The horrors
of internment camps are recounted
in loving detail. Of a camp near
Amos, Québec, the author wrote:
“For two years, 1,200 prisoners,
including 60 women and children,
were held there at gunpoint” (97).
Conscription is presented as a vicious plot by the wicked Anglos to
oppress the noble people of Québec
(109-13). When the author tires of
describing the awfulness of Canada,
he or she demonstrates a laughable
lack of knowledge about the Great
War, thus: “The king of England
abandoned the Germanic name of
Hanover and announced that the
family would henceforth [sic] adopt
the surname Windsor” (97). The
point about Windsor is correct, but
prior to 1916, the family’s name
was Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, not
Hanover. On page 104 we find,
“Early in 1917, the Allied Command” – although a unified Allied
command was not formed until the
spring of 1918. The author noted
that, by the end of 1917, Lloyd
George had lost confidence in
Douglas Haig, but asserted that Haig
kept his job because he was “a protege of King George V” (122), as if
George V had been the actual political ruler of the UK. Immediately
after this, the author made the preposterous statement that, in 1917,
40,000 French soldiers deserted
(122). Such failings of contemporary Canadian historical writing are
a manifestation of a problem that
is central to historiography. We can
only look at the past through the
lens of the present. Two French
authors have recently argued that
our current obsession with victims
has limited our ability to develop a
proper understanding of the Great
War.21
There are a few bright spots in
current Canadian work about the
Great War. One is C.E.F. Books,
which was started in 1995 by Norman Christie, an engineering graduate from Queen’s University who
spent several years working for the
Commonwealth War Graves Com-
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mission, with the aim of increasing
Canadians’ knowledge of the Great
War. During its short history, C.E.F.
Books has become a major publisher. It has done a great service
to Canadian history and to Canadian literature by republishing
many works which had long been
out of print. Will R. Bird was a
major Canadian writer of the twentieth century, but the only book of
Bird’s with which I had been familiar is Sunrise for Peter and Other
Stories, first published in 1946 and
out of print for decades. “Sunrise
for Peter” is a moving story about
Newfoundlanders at the Somme.
Bird’s writing is the perfect complement to the people he was writing about – honest, direct, straightforward, and unpretentious. C.E.F.
Books has reintroduced Bird to
Canadians by re-issuing some of his
long-unavailable classics, like Thirteen Years After and Ghosts Have
Warm Hands. In addition to publishing books, C.E.F. Books has
produced two television series: For
King and Empire, about Canadians
in the Great War, and For King and
Country, about Canadians in the
Second World War. What these two
series demonstrate, in contrast to
the pathetic rubbish offered by the
CBC, is that it is possible to produce material which is both good
history and good television. Canadians owe a great debt of gratitude
to C.E.F. Books.
Apart from C.E.F. Books,
some serious historical work about
the Great War has been published
in recent years. Two good examples
are Jack Granatstein and Desmond
Morton’s Canada and the Two
World Wars (Toronto: Key Porter,
2003); and Canada and the Great
War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2003), edited by
Briton C. Busch and reviewed in
the most recent issue of this Book
Review Supplement.

E

C. Conclusion

ven more amazing than the fact
that people continue to write
large numbers of works of history
and pseudo-history about a war that
ended nearly ninety years ago, is
the fact that other people write nov-
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els about it. Patricia Barker is probably the leading living Great War
novelist, but mention must also be
made of Sebastian Faulks and his
affecting novel Birdsong (New York:
Vintage, 1993). At the centre of
Birdsong is a love affair between a
British soldier and a French
woman. The British soldier was
involved in tunnelling, or mining,
the most horrible way of fighting in
that most horrible of wars. The
British would send out tunnels under the German lines, fill them with
explosives, and then, as at Messines
in 1917, detonate them to great effect. The Germans would send out
counter-tunnels with the aim of destroying the British tunnels. Occasionally, German tunnellers would
break into a British tunnel and then
the tunnellers, like packs of crazed
moles, would try to kill each other
with picks, shovels, and bare
hands. Faulks has presented some
horrifying descriptions of this surreal form of warfare.
The tide of Great War books is
likely to become a tsunami as August 2014 approaches. This should
be a remarkable time for Great War
aficionados. My major hope is that
the CBC does not decide to prepare
a series on the Great War.
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John Boileau, Fastest in the
World: The Saga of Canada’s
Revolutionary Hydrofoils (Halifax:
Formac, 2004), $24.95, 96 pages,
ISBN 0-88780-621-X.

T

he sad story of the Arrow,
Canada’s supersonic fighter,
has attracted an enormous amount
of public attention. The fate of
HMCS Bras d’Or, the world’s fastest warship, is much less well
known. John Boileau, a retired
Canadian Army officer, has corrected this oversight. He packs an
enormous amount of information on
Canadian hydrofoils into less than
one hundred pages. The tightly written text is complemented by excellent photographs.
The first section of the book
deals with the hydrofoil experiments of Alexander Graham Bell,
Casey Baldwin, and others on Bras
d’Or Lake in Cape Breton. Bell, an
inveterate tinkerer, focused his attention on kite-shaped “aerodromes,” his name for flying machines, and this led to the construction of hydrofoils. His best effort,
HD-4, reached 114 kilometres an
hour. Boileau tells of the role that
Mabel, Alexander’s wife, played in
providing financial and moral support to the team of innovators. He
describes how hydrofoil technology
took off in Europe, while lagging
in North America. The military
showed interest in Bell’s work during the First World War, but never
grasped the potential of his fast vessels. As Boileau puts it of Casey
Baldwin’s innovative ideas, “none
of them made him rich, but a
number of them did make him
happy.”
This happy knack for illustrative phrases marks the second section of the book, which deals with
HMCS Bras d’Or. A certain admiral is described as being “a legend
in his own mind,” and one of the
hydrofoil’s problems was fixed, in
the words of man who did it, with
“a coke can and silicone.” Boileau
spoke to key people involved in the
venture, and does an excellent job
of blending technical, human, and
military factors in his story of the
rise and fall of this unique vessel.
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The book has a sense of immediacy
and great relevance in our time as
those involved with the hydrofoil
speak frankly about the faults, failures, and frustrations of cuttingedge innovation. Paul Hellyer became a champion of the vessel,
Mike Eames its main proponent,
and Gordon Edwards its flamboyant captain. Their energy, commitment, and skills did not prevail
against a political system that did
not understand what they were trying to achieve and shifted defence
priorities without regard to Canada’s potential for doing different
things that had universal applicability.
After an expenditure of $53
million, HMCS Bras d’Or, which
reached a speed of sixty-two knots,
now sits onshore at La Musée Maritime du Québec at L’Islet on the St.
Lawrence River, a monument to the
failure of innovative technology to
break through fossilized political
and military thinking.
JL
*****
Galen Perras, Stepping Stones to
Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands,
Alaska, and American Military
Strategy, 1867-1945 (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2003), $85.00, 288
pages, ISBN 0-7748-0989-2.

I

n this book, Galen Perras revisits a frequently overlooked incident in the history of the Second
World War, the 1943 American expedition to liberate the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska from the
Japanese. His purpose is threefold:
to place the Aleutian campaign in
the context of a longstanding debate
on Alaska’s strategic importance, to
demonstrate that the liberation of
Attu and Kiska was integral to a
contemplated northern assault on
Japan, and to document Canadian
involvement in the defence of Alaska
and the Aleutians. The result is a
comprehensive study which, rather
than portraying the Aleutian campaign merely as a quixotic and ultimately inconsequential operation,
explores the competing opinions
and interests that led to the battles
of Attu and Kiska.

Perras’ first three chapters examine American perceptions of
Alaska’s strategic importance during the period between the 1867
purchase of Russian America and
the Japanese occupation of Attu and
Kiska in June 1942. Secretary of
State William H. Seward, the man
responsible for the purchase of
Alaska, predicted it would take a
generation for his compatriots to
recognize the strategic value of his
acquisition. The defence of Alaska
was clearly of secondary concern
during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, in spite of the
best efforts of commentators such
as Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan
and newspaper columnist Hector C.
Bywater to present Alaska as the
key to American dominance in the
Pacific. Even after Pearl Harbor,
rivalry between the army and navy
frustrated efforts to develop a strategic plan for Alaska and the Aleutians. While the commander of the
army in Alaska, Brig.-Gen. Simon
Bolivar Buckner, Jr., firmly believed the territory would play a
critical role in the defeat of Japan,
others, particularly in the navy,
were much more concerned with
securing the South Pacific.
Having outlined the debate regarding the value of Alaska and the
Aleutians to American strategy in
the Pacific, Perras argues that political imperative outweighed strategic considerations in the decision
to force the Japanese from Attu and
Kiska. Although many strategists
believed the Japanese presence in
the western Aleutians posed no
threat to the United States, enemy
forces could not be allowed to remain on American soil, so the
Americans fought a costly battle on
Attu and embarked on an unnecessary offensive against Kiska.
Dreams of a northern offensive
against the Japanese home islands
did not disappear, however.
Buckner and Lieut.-Gen. John
DeWitt saw the occupation of the
Kurile Islands, a prospective base
for such an offensive, as a logical
continuation of the Aleutian campaign. Soviet cooperation was the
sine qua non of any North Pacific
front, and President Roosevelt’s
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decision to grant the Kuriles to the
Soviets put an end to Buckner’s
dream of an “open door to Tokyo”
through Alaska. Perras concludes
that, from a strategic standpoint,
the Aleutian campaign could and
should have been avoided, and he
agrees with other scholars that
events in the North Pacific had little impact on the outcome of the
war. Nevertheless, faith in Alaska’s
strategic importance continued
through the Cold War, and the garrisoning of Alaska should be regarded as historically significant
insofar as it precipitated the social,
economic, and political development of the territory.
Canadian military historians
will find Perras’ discussion of Canadian involvement in the Aleutian
campaign to be of particular interest. While civilian officials, including O.D. Skelton, Norman
Robertson, and even Prime Minister Mackenzie King, supported cooperation with the United States in
the defence of the west coast, the
army was much more concerned
with events in Europe and the Atlantic and hoped to avoid entanglements in the Pacific. Perras’ treatment of the Canadian dimension
thus suggests that Canada’s early rejection of west coast defence responsibilities, documented by
Glynn Barratt in Russian Shadows
on the Pacific Northwest Coast,
continued until well into the Second World War. Only when their political masters raised the spectre of
a Japanese invasion of British Columbia, as Mackenzie King did in
1942, did the army reluctantly agree
to unity of command with the United
States in Pacific defence.
Based on extensive archival
research in the United States,
Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom, Stepping Stones to Nowhere is an authoritative yet readable (if sometimes dry) account of
the place of Alaska and the Aleutians in American strategy. As
Perras is the first to admit, this is
a “top-down” military history and
there is little in this book for those
interested in soldiers’ and sailors’
experiences of Aleutian defence. His
concentration on official sources

also leads him to overstate initial
American disinterest in Alaska; as
Richard E. Welch, Jr., has demonstrated, the American press was
nearly unanimous in its support of
the Alaska purchase, and cited both
economic and strategic justifications. Greater discussion of public
opinion may have supported his
assertion that politics rather than
strategy motivated American military activities in the Aleutians. This
shortcoming notwithstanding, Stepping Stones to Nowhere succeeds
in placing American activities in
Alaska and the Aleutians during the
Second World War, often dismissed
as trivial in the historiography, into
a broader context than has hitherto
been recognized.
FDP
*****
Pamela Howe Taylor, The Germans
We Trusted: Stories That Had To
Be Told (Cambridge, UK:
Lutterworth Press, 2003), $25.00
US paper, 208 pages, ISBN 0-71883034-2.

P

amela Taylor’s contact with German prisoners of war began in
her childhood, when her father became the padre at a POW camp in
Lancashire. Her first account of the
relationships between captors and
captives was Enemies Became
Friends (later transformed into a
BBC documentary), and this book
recounts thirty-six stories of friendship between prisoners and the civilians they came into contact with.
Of the more than 400,000 Germans
detained in Britain during and after the Second World War, over
25,000 decided to remain there after they were released. Clearly, there
are many stories of friendship between enemies to be told.
One, the story of Peter
Heathfield, is representative. Peter
had been a conscientious objector
during the war and when the British government announced after the
war that civilians could invite German POWs into their homes, Peter
was enthusiastic. His father, however, had served as an under-aged
soldier in the trenches of the Great
War, had no time for anything Ger-
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man, and couldn’t understand why
both his son and his brother had
become conscientious objectors.
So, when Peter agreed to tutor a
POW in English in his home, he had
to pick times when his father was
away. The prisoner repaid the kindness by doing odd jobs around the
house and when Mr. Heathfield
started to wonder who was doing
all the chores, the two men were
introduced and the old soldier’s
long-seeded hatred of Germans was
overcome. The Heathfields would
host a number of prisoners in succeeding months, and Peter kept in
touch with some of them when they
eventually returned to Germany.
Not all German POWs were so
keen to establish relationships with
their captors, but for those who had
been reluctant soldiers or who had
realized the error of their ways,
Allied efforts at denazification gave
them the opportunity to make
friends with local civilians. These
thirty-six stories represent the experience of just a few who took
advantage of that opportunity.
JFV
*****
Victor Suthern, The Sea Has No
End: The Life of Louis-Antoine de
Bougainville (Toronto: Dundurn
Group, 2004), $35.00, 216 pages,
ISBN 1-55002-519-8.

F

or many military historians, the
name Bougainville conjures up
images of a Pacific island over
which the Americans and Japanese
battled during the Second World
War. In this biography, Victor
Suthern tells of the man for whom
the island was named, and whose
military successes in the eighteenth
century made him a hero in France.
Born in Paris, Bougainville
joined the Régiment de Picardie in
1753, and three years later sailed
to Canada as aide-de-camp to
Montcalm. He was thrust almost
immediately into the fighting, being involved in the capture of
Oswego and later, at his own request, in the patrolling along the
Lake George - Lake Champlain corridor. He was deeply involved in
the rest of the campaign in North
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America (his arrival on the Plains
of Abraham, had it come thirty minutes earlier, argues Suthern, could
have changed the outcome of the
battle), and it was perhaps fitting
that he negotiated the surrender of
French forces at Montreal to the
British in 1760.
He then set his sights farther
afield, leading an expedition to establish a French settlement on the
Falkland Islands, and in 1766 embarked on a world voyage (in the
course of which he encountered the
Pacific island that now bears his
name). His military career ended
dramatically: he commanded one
of the French flotillas that kept the
Royal Navy away from Cornwallis’
besieged army at Yorktown during
the American Revolution, an act that
cemented his reputation as a hero
and, perhaps, allowed him to survive the turbulent years of the
French Revolution (during which he
was a senior commander in the
revolutionary navy).
Suthern has the benefit of
Bougainville’s journals, kept in
North America from 1756-60 and
during his Pacific voyage of 176778, and has produced an interesting and very readable biography.
Bougainville comes across as a
model of his time – intelligent,
worldly, cultured, and brave, and
someone who deserves to be better
known than for an island in the
Pacific.
BL
*****
Mike Parker, Fortress Halifax:
Portrait of a Garrison Town (Halifax: Nimbus, 2004), $24.95, 244
pages, ISBN 1-55109-494-0.

O

able manner, enriching his narrative with contemporary accounts
and 200 photos. Neat phrases catch
the essence of the times: The Royal
Navy was “an equal opportunity
employer” – it would take anyone!
For its first sixty years, Fortress Halifax served as a military
and naval outpost. During the nineteenth century, it became an important base for the Royal Navy. Much
of the work done on the fortifications was slipshod. The citadel
never heard a shot fired in anger.
Built and rebuilt four times – with
massive cost overruns – its history
reflects a feature of military planning and expenditure that is still
with us.
Parker shows exceptional skill
in putting a human face on military
history. In doing so, he turns one
garrison town into a microcosm of
many other colonial outposts. Between 1783 and 1896, 436 British
regiments served in Halifax. Parker
has a fine feel for what life was like
for ordinary soldiers and sailors.
The book contains an enormous
amount of fascinating information
on uniforms (including kilts), army
rations, strong drink, the pranks
of officers, crime and punishment,
and other aspects of garrison life
in Canada. Fortress Halifax is both
readable and an excellent reference
source on military life in Canada.
A few typographical errors dot
the text (“heros” on page 154,
“siutation” on page 176, and “the
vagrancies of war and peace” on
page 50). A better map than the one
on page 5 would have enhanced the
volume. But none of these minor
gaffes detract from the value of this
enjoyable book.
JL

men who couldn’t meet the minimum height for enlistment. In the
South Alberta Regiment, Galipeau’s
company was formed up from the
tallest to shortest and the platoons
divided up that way – all the tallest
men went into the Headquarters
platoon, the shortest into #12 Platoon. Their designation as the
Peewee Platoon became an object of
great pride for the men, and the
conduct of the Peewees in action
certainly justifies their pride.
Over half of Galipeau’s memoir
deals with his training, both in
Canada and England, but the last
eighty pages covers his service at
the front. He landed with his unit
at Courselles-sur-Mer on 25 July
1944 and stayed with the South
Albertas throughout the campaign
in Northwest Europe, save for the
occasional period of leave. He has
some fascinating things to say about
fighting through the campaign in a
Sherman – one only wishes that he
said them at greater length. He
writes like a typically laconic soldier – the description is short and
to the point, often too much so. The
section dealing with the unit’s engagement at St. Lambert-sur-Dives
occupies barely a page, while the
crossing of the Ghent Canal takes
up about the same.
In sum, it’s an interesting
memoir, but one that is best read
in conjunction with a more detailed
history, like Don Graves’ South
Albertas: A Canadian Regiment
at War. The only regret is that
Galipeau, who saw so much action
in Northwest Europe, couldn’t be
persuaded to describe it in more
detail.
TV

*****

Howard Hewer, In For a Penny, In
For a Pound: The Adventures and
Misadventures of a Wireless Operator in Bomber Command (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2004),
$22.00 paper, 274 pages, ISBN 0385-66077-4.

*****

riginally known as Fort George,
Halifax Citadel served as a
keystone of imperial defence. Mike
Parker sets the history of the fortress and Halifax into local, national, and international context
from before 1749, when the town
was founded, to 1945. The book
“was conceived with the amateur
history enthusiast in mind, but
hopefully scholars will glean something of value.” Parker fulfills this
goal admirably and in a highly read-

hese peewees were not quite
like the Bantam Battalions of
the First World War, made up of

8

© Canadian Military History Book Review Supplement, Summer 2005

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss3/7

John A. Galipeau and Pattie
Whitehouse, Peewees on Parade:
Wartime Memories of a Young
(and Small) Soldier (Toronto:
Robin Brass Studio, 2002), $24.95
paper, 248 pages, ISBN 1-89694130-3.

T

T

he title of Howard Hewer’s fine
memoir comes from an old
English colloquialism, but it is also
a reference to Lord Moran’s famous
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allusion to a man’s will to fight as
being like a bank account that can
be overdrawn. “In For a Penny” covers the period of training, while “In
For a Pound” puts Hewer into the
heart of the action, flying Wellington bombers over occupied Europe.
“The Remaining Fifteen Shillings”
provides perhaps the most interesting section of the book, an account
of his operations in North Africa,
and “All Spent” brings us to the end
of his service career. He was “all
spent” physically, the rigours of
service, particularly in the harsh
conditions of North Africa, having
weakened his body to the point
where he could no longer fly operationally. Ironically, it was in that
period when he came closest to
death on two occasions: in a mysterious and ill-advised night flight
to an Advanced Landing Ground
that ended in a crash landing; and
in a motor expedition deep behind
enemy lines to scout out a location
for a possible advanced fighter airfield.
Hewer’s memoir has some fascinating insights that have not yet
been fully discussed. He talks about
the problem of leadership in
bomber units, a commodity that he
finds was sadly lacking in the North
Africa (where, indeed, he was involved in a “mutiny” that was directed more than anything at senior officers who demanded spit and
polish from exhausted aircrews).
There was also the culture shock
of leaving Britain, where aircrews
at least lived in decent accommodations, for North Africa, where the
accommodations were rather more
primitive than in the average Boy
Scout camp. The operations they
flew over the desert were every bit
as dangerous as those in Europe,
but crews in North Africa never
enjoyed the comforts and amenities
of Britain that were so important
in helping them to deal with the
stresses of combat.
We have a good number of
memoirs relating to Bomber Command operations in Europe, but
Hewer’s is the first in many years
to cover North Africa at a point
when the result there hung very

much in the balance. He is to be
commended for shedding light on
this lesser known part of the war
with such sensitivity and acuity.
CA
*****
Glen Hancock, Charley Goes to
War (Kentville, NS: Gaspereau
Press, 2004), $27.95, 298 pages,
ISBN 1-894031-95-4.

O

f a group of thirty-five airmen
with whom Glen Hancock
trained at one base, only five survived the war. This extraordinary
memoir by a Nova Scotian wireless
operator/air gunner (WAG) touches
on numerous aspects of service life
in the Second World War. Hancock
has a unique ability to evoke past
times, places, and people. His book
also has a surrealistic tone.
Hancock trained as a pilot, showed
great promise, then simply quit in
1941. Sent back to a base in
Brandon, Manitoba, with others like
him, he idled away his days until
receiving an honourable discharge
“for Reason of Psychological Instability.” He went farming, rejoined
the RCAF, and while waiting to be
called back joined the Canadian
Army under a false name, claiming
to be an American. Eventually,
Hancock flew in Hudsons during
the Battle of the Atlantic, joined 408
Squadron of Bomber Command in
1944, and completed a tour on operations.
This book recalls, in vivid detail, what life was like at the sharp
end of the RCAF. Despite its length,
it reads easily. Hancock writes
about bomber crew selection, how
some crews survived and why others did not, pubbing in England,
fear in the air and a man with a
death wish, meeting John
Masefield, the poet laureate, and a
mysterious stranger who prayed for
him, an encounter with a kind British bank manager, being wounded
by flak, censoring letters in Newfoundland. The writer has a fine eye
for the absurdities of service life
that will raise a reflective smile
among those who have been there.
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The book conveys an immediate feel of wartime flying and the
perils and pleasures of service life.
The last paragraph, in a few fine
words, sums up what Hancock’s
time in the RCAF meant to him,
echoing the feelings of many wartime flyers.
Tighter editing and a perusal
of the manuscript by someone familiar with the history of the Second World War would have added
to the excellence of this fine
memoir. The writer digresses about
Chinese railway workers, the naming of the Queen Mary, and other
topics, slowing the strong narrative
thrust of the book. Overall, Charley
Goes to War is a significant contribution to the history of the RCAF
and to our understanding of those
like Glen Hancock who lived
through days and night of glory and
terror.
JL
*****
Atholl Sutherland Brown, Buster,
A Canadian Patriot: The Life and
Times of Brigadier James Sutherland Brown (Victoria: Trafford
Publishing, 2004), $32.00 paper,
229 pages, ISBN 1-4120-2522-2.

U

sually, if he appears at all in
the pages of Canadian history
books, “Buster” Brown appears as
the author of the controversial Defence Scheme No. 1 to defend
Canada from an attack by the United
States. He is often characterized as
a little loopy, a portrayal that this
biography by his son demonstrates
is not only unfair but inaccurate.
After a spell at the Staff College at Camberley (where his classmates included Canadians
MacBrien, Morrison, and Borden,
future CIGSs Ironside and Dill, and
J.F.C. Fuller), Brown served as a
capable and respected staff officer
during the First World War. It was
as Director of Military Operations
and Intelligence that he drew up the
now notorious Defence Scheme No.
1, which was in fact an elaboration
of a project he had been assigned
at Camberley. Then there was
Brown’s confrontation with Andy
MacNaughton, in which the politi-
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cally savvier MacNaughton came out
on top. It was that episode that precipitated his premature resignation
in June 1933.
“Buster” Brown’s life, then, was
one of potential that was never quite
realized. He was a complicated individual, not without flaws, but his
son is fair and judicious in dealing
with all aspects of his life. He defends “Buster” where previous historians have been unfair to him,
and criticizes his father where it is
warranted. This is not an exercise
in hagiography, but a carefully researched and argued biography.
Enlivened by family as well as official photographs, Buster provides
a glimpse of a man who was unfairly
maligned, both during his life and
after.
BL
*****
S.P. MacKenzie, The Colditz Myth:
The Real Story of POW Life in
Nazi Germany (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2004), $57.00,
446 pages, ISBN 0-19-926210-1.

T

here is a myth about captivity
in Nazi Germany, a myth built
largely on a single camp: Oflag IVC,
better known as Colditz Castle, located between Leipzig and Dresden.
As MacKenzie describes in this fascinating account, Colditz attained
cultural status, not only through
published memoirs, but through
films, television dramas, documentaries, even children’s games. ExColditzers occasionally jousted
over the picture of their captivity
that was being created, but the public loved it: “Colditz” in any title
became a virtual guarantee of good
sales. And “Colditz,” in this case,
meant a prison camp filled with
healthy and well fed prisoners who
tried to outwit their generally genial captors with constant escape
schemes.
After an absorbing chapter on
the evolution of them myth,
MacKenzie gets into the main body
of the study, a thematic examination of the realities of life in captivity, including work, recreation, reprisals, collaboration, and liberation. If the organization of the book
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seems conventional, MacKenzie’s
handling of it is not: this is one of
the best surveys of life in German
prison camps that has been published in decades. His command of
the sources, both primary and secondary, is impressive, and he certainly knows his subject matter, as
anyone who has read his many earlier articles on POWs will already
know. In short, the specialist or
general reader looking for a solid,
readable survey of the subject
should begin here.
MacKenzie concludes with the
cautionary tale of a plan to make
another Colditz movie starring, believe it or not, Tom Cruise, Matt
Damon, and Ben Affleck (but not
Jennifer I or II?). A public outcry
over the Americanization of a very
un-American story (there were only
a handful of Americans in the camp,
all of whom reached it after D-Day)
forced the studio to back-peddle
and announce a European co-production with European actors instead. But even that has dropped
off the radar. The lesson, as
MacKenzie argues persuasively, is
that people meddle with myth at
their peril.
CA
*****
Sean M. Maloney, Canada and
U.N. Peacekeeping: Cold War by
Other Means, 1945-1970 (St.
Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2002),
$35.00 paper, 288 pages, ISBN 155125-088-8.

A

longside medicare and
multiculturalism, peacekeeping ranks as one of this country’s
greatest objects of self-adulation. In
Canada and UN Peacekeeping,
author Sean Maloney takes the mythology head-on. As he explains it,
“Canadian Exceptionalism” – the
belief that this country is different
and morally superior to the pushy
and sometimes violent Americans
– has distorted the meaning of
peacekeeping. After all, who could
object to the image of the noncolonialist, impartial middle power
ready to do the world’s bidding
whenever an international crisis
was at hand? Maloney argues that

this myth, spoon-fed over the last
generation by politicians and pundits alike, needs redress. To him,
peacekeeping before the collapse of
Communism cannot be understood
without examining Canadian strategic interests around the world during the Cold War, interests that
were based on participation in the
Western alliance system, particularly within NATO.
In scholarly circles, there are
two traditional explanations for
Canada’s participation in peacekeeping missions during the Cold
War. The first is that humanitarian
crises such as refugees, famine, and
communalism needed to be monitored and resolved because they
had the power to destabilize conflict zones in areas as disparate as
Africa, Palestine, Kashmir, and
East Asia. The second reason was
to stop conflict between smaller
powers. Such “brushfire” or
“proxy” wars had the potential to
engage the superpowers in a direct
confrontation, one in which Canada
would almost certainly become
deeply involved.
Contrary to these rationales,
Maloney suggests that there were
ulterior motives in Canadian decisions to participate in peacekeeping missions. In using the example
of the 1949 Kashmir-based United
Nations Military Observer Group in
India Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the
first-ever Canadian peace mission,
the author demonstrates that there
was a real concern among decisionmakers in Ottawa about Western
bases in the region. He points out
that Pakistani and Indian airbases
would be critical in a nuclear war
against the Soviet Union in the
1950s, and a stable and friendly
subcontinent was in Canada’s interest. In a similar manner, when the
crisis in the Congo erupted in 1960,
Canada participated in the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo
(ONUC) because of concerns for
Belgian sea bases that protected
West African NATO Sea Lines of
Communications. If such bases were
lost to Communist involvement in
the Congo, this could threaten trade
links with Asia and Africa. In all
the other examples of the book, the
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author makes the case that Canada
had a primarily military rationale
for intervention, not merely moral
or political.
To many academics who study
Canadian foreign policy, some of
Maloney’s ideas may be quite new.
Accustomed as they may be to the
memoirs of diplomats and the
records of the Department of External Affairs, realist concerns of
such a military nature may appear
out of the ordinary. The particular
strength of this book is that it provides the military’s view of Canadian participation in peacekeeping
ventures. An examination of the
sources used reveals a heavy emphasis on material from the Department of National Defence. In this
sense, the book fills a gap in the
existing Canadian literature on
peacekeeping.
However, Maloney’s reliance on
Cold War geopolitics to explain Canadian motives comes close to developing its own erroneous orthodoxy. In some places the account
simply goes too far. For example,
he contends that the second Canadian peacekeeping mission to the
Asian subcontinent after the 1965
Kashmir war was ostensibly about
the Central Intelligence Agency U-2
base and the National Security
Agency intelligence facility near
Peshawar, Pakistan. While the maintenance of this base was certainly
in the Western interest, the author
never provides evidence that Canadian diplomats and military thinkers were particularly concerned
about this in their plan to join the
United Nations India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM). Cabinet
discussions about the 1965 Kashmir war and the UNIPOM mission,
for instance, focused on avoiding a
communal bloodbath in the subcontinent and the possibility of China
entering the war and expanding it.
Often Maloney does not convincingly demonstrate that Western
strategic interests were in the
minds of Canadian diplomats and
soldiers as they made decisions
about participation in certain
United Nations missions.

Despite this, military and diplomatic historians will find much
of value here. The book certainly
points out new avenues of investigation and reconsideration, even if
some claims are not fully substantiated. Although clearly designed
for the general audience, scholars
interested in peacekeeping issues
will find the book a handy reference to Canadian involvement in
peacekeeping missions up to 1970.
Students of peacekeeping will also
find detailed footnoting, a methodical bibliography, and extremely
good regional maps useful for their
own research.
OK
*****
Murray Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front,
1915-1919 (Ipswich: Old Pond
Publishing, 2004), $40.00, 143
pages, ISBN 1-903366-64-X.

B

ritish Expeditionary Force operations on the Western Front
required immeasurable levels of
food, fuel, ammunition, and building materials. In this impressively
illustrated volume, Murray Maclean
explores the front-line production
of foodstuffs and forest products
by the British Army and its Dominion counterparts. Because Britain
imported a significant proportion
of its food supplies from North
American and Australia, the
logistical burden placed on the
BEF supply apparatus was relatively
heavy. Much material needed to
cross the Atlantic or Pacific oceans
before reaching Britain and being
transhipped to the French channel
ports. The army sought to minimize
this burden by producing a portion
of its own food and timber in close
proximity to the front line.
Maclean, an experienced
horticulturalist by profession, is
intimately familiar with the technical aspects of this story. He sets the
context with a brief examination of
the operational and logistical difficulties confronting the BEF on the
continent. The first part of the book
examines British Army farming
operations, including the integration of local French farmers, the
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challenges of animal husbandry, and
the development of coordinated
crop production. In the second half,
Maclean turns to the highly skilled
lumberjacks of the Canadian Forestry Corps. A massive volume of
timber was required for the construction and repair of front line
fortifications as well as rear echelon housing. The local production
of this bulky commodity helped to
compensate for chronic timber
shortages, and by 1917 the British,
Canadian, and French authorities
developed a sophisticated harvesting network.
In a note on sources, Maclean
indicates that he was unable to locate the personal accounts and official unit war diaries that constitute the staple evidence of military
history. Clearly he has overlooked
the relatively comprehensive collection of Canadian Forestry Corps
war diaries housed at the Library
and Archives of Canada (a broad
range of records is available for the
period 1916-19). Notwithstanding
this omission, it must be said that
the book is profusely illustrated
with premium-quality, authoritatively captioned, large-format photographs culled from Imperial War
Museum collections during more
than a decade of research. There is
a great wealth of information here
for the material historian, as well
as anyone concerned with early
twentieth-century agricultural practices, mechanization, inter-Allied
cooperation, and First World War
logistics.
AI
*****
Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell
Publishing, 2003), $39.95, 288
pages, ISBN 1-550-681-257; Nathan
M. Greenfield, The Battle of the
St. Lawrence: The Second World
War in Canada (Toronto:
HarperCollins, 2004), $34.95, 256
pages, ISBN 0-002-006-642.

T

he coming of the sixtieth anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic has, not surprisingly,
spawned several new additions to
the historiography of this long and
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bloody campaign. Two recent Canadian contributions to this body
of literature are Marc Milner’s Battle of the Atlantic and Nathan M.
Greenfield’s The Battle of the St.
Lawrence. Both are self-consciously popular histories and, as
such, are written to appeal primarily to a mass readership. However,
both maintain a fairly high level of
scholarship, with a few notable exceptions.
Milner’s Battle of the Atlantic
builds on his previous works on
the campaign, North Atlantic Run
(1985) and The U-Boat Hunters
(1994). He also draws heavily upon
W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, and
Michael Whitby’s recent official
operational history of the Royal
Canadian Navy during the Second
World War. Milner argues that
ASDIC was not the solution to the
U-Boat dilemma that the Royal Navy
(and, by extension, the Royal Canadian Navy) believed it to be during
the interwar period. Instead, he
asserts that the combination of the
maintenance of the convoy system
infrastructure developed during the
First World War, air power, radar,
and well-equipped, trained, and
numerous surface escorts were the
keys to victory against the
Kriegsmarine’s U-Boat fleet. Of
course, this argument provides the
foundation for yet another finely
crafted, detailed, and engrossing
narrative for which Professor
Milner has become known.
Although it is a general survey
of the Battle of the Atlantic, Milner
could not resist defending the Royal
Canadian Navy’s much-maligned
contribution to the campaign. He
notes that the Royal Navy’s wartime
criticism of the RCN’s performance, particularly during the dark
days of 1942, conveniently ignored
the fact that “the RCN bore the brunt
of German attacks, with weak and
poorly equipped escort groups protecting the most vulnerable targets
[the slow “S” convoys] and relying
on a radar [SW1C and Type 286
metric wavelength] which betrayed
their presence” (118). In the end,
according to Milner, the RCN’s willingness to bear the brunt of the
mid-ocean escort duties during

1942, far from damaging the Allied
war effort, actually allowed the
Royal Navy to refit and train its
escorts in preparation for the climactic battles of 1943-44 which
largely drove the deadly Wolfpacks
from the Atlantic (119).
Nathan Greenfield’s The Battle of the St. Lawrence provides a
useful compliment to Milner’s
study, focusing on the U-Boat campaigns of 1942 and 1944 in Canadian territorial waters. Not only
does Greenfield explore these attacks thoroughly, often using firsthand accounts by participants on
both sides, but he also attempts to
place the U-Boat campaign in the
St. Lawrence in a broader cultural
context. He argues that his study is
an attempt to restore a lost portion
of Canadians’ social memory: “The
Battle of the St. Lawrence wasn’t
hidden from Canadians during the
war. Rather, for three generations
the nation’s curriculum writers have
been engaged in an ongoing act of
forgetting. Forgetting that in the
darkest days of the Second World
War, hundreds of men, women and
children were killed by Nazis who
plied our inland waters. Forgetting
that thousands of Canadians volunteered to defend our shores. This
book, then, is an act of historical
recovery” (4-5). Greenfield’s narrative traces the various sinkings, in
the St. Lawrence River and Gulf of
St. Lawrence, and does an admirable job of exploring the political
firestorm that the sinkings (and the
government censorship of them)
provoked.
Although both books make for
interesting and enjoyable reads,
they suffer from editorial problems. It is perfectly understandable
for both authors to desire to write
for a wider, non-academic audience, but that should not have precluded the proper use of footnotes,
particularly when a direct quotation
from a published source was used.
Greenfield’s book also suffers
from several factual errors, many
of which involve erroneous dates
(on page 19, Canada is described
as having declared war on 8 September 1939 instead of the 10th). As
well, the names of several promi-

12

© Canadian Military History Book Review Supplement, Summer 2005

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss3/7

nent persons are confused, with
Canadian naval historian Gilbert
Tucker being mistakenly referred
to as “Gordon Tucker” (141) and
American Admiral Ernest J. King
as “Admiral Edward King” (53).
This reviewer counted five similar
errors throughout Greenfield’s
book, which is certainly worrisome
in a serious, published work of history.
Given that the readership of
both of these books will include
academic historians and knowledgeable enthusiasts of military history, both of whom have very good
eyes for detail, the inconsistent
footnoting and, in the case of The
Battle of the St. Lawrence, avoidable factual errors, will only serve
to frustrate and annoy them. More
seriously, these editorial problems
had the effect of weakening my
overall impression of what were
otherwise two very enjoyable reads.
DR
*****
Wayne Neal, Five Boys from Myrtle Street: True Stories of Canadian Airmen in World War II (Privately published [available from the
author at 2181 Rockville Road, RR
#1, Mindemoya, Ontario, POP 1S0],
2003), $21.50 paper, 271 pages,
ISBN 0-9373401-0-X.

T

he premiss of this book is one
that admits of limitless possibilities: choose any street in
Canada, and write a collective biography of the individuals living on
that street who served Canada in
wartime. In this case, Wayne Neal
has chosen Myrtle Street in St. Thomas, a railway town in south-western Ontario, and looks at five of
the young men who left the neighbourhood, some never to return.
They grew up together on Myrtle Street, attended the same
schools and churches, played together, knew each other’s families,
and when war came, they all enlisted
for service. The first, Neil Campbell,
was already in uniform, having
joined the Royal Air Force in 1938.
Through his eyes, we see the experience of the Few who defended
against the German air armada
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during the Battle of Britain. Neil’s
next-door neighbour, Cam Rowe,
was a fighter pilot as well, flying
with 403 Squadron RCAF at the
time when it was led by the legendary Johnny Johnson. The three
others flew on multi-engine aircraft.
Bill Burton, after training as an air
gunner, went overseas in 1942 and
flew two tours in Europe and North
Africa. After the second tour, he and
his crew were all awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross – but Bill
never bothered to tell his family.
Bill Underhill trained as a bomb
aimer, and flew Halifaxes with 415
Squadron RCAF. The fifth was Jack
Murray, the author’s uncle, who
flew Coastal Command Liberators
on anti-submarine patrols.
Neal has relied heavily on the
letters and log-books of the five to
produce vivid, compelling accounts
of their operations. He also bring
in his own memories – the shock
to the family when it learned that
Jack had been badly hurt in a crash,
the day when a young playmate
learned that his father had been
killed (just a few days before VEDay). It all makes for a fascinating
account of how war, through the
experiences of five young men, affected the lives of the residents of
one street.
BL
*****
Ian McCulloch and Timothy Todish,
eds., Through So Many Dangers:
The Memoirs and Adventures of
Robert Kirk, Late of the Royal
Highland Regiment (Toronto:
Robin Brass Studio, 2004), $30.00
paper, 174 pages, ISBN 1-89694141-9.

E

ighteenth-century publishers
were very fond of immensely
long titles that described the entire
contents of the book. In this case,
the original title of Kirk’s memoir
was The Memoirs and Adventures
of Robert Kirk, Late of the Royal
Highland Regiment, containing a
journal of the most important Occurrences in the Late War; the
Reduction of Crown-Point, Montreal, &c. A description of the
back Parts of North-America; of the

Great Lakes, Rivers and Waterfalls; of the Beasts, Birds, Fish
Fruits, Trees, Articles of Commerce and Prices of Skins. The
Customs of the Indians, with
Whom the Author lived for some
time; their Methods of Hunting,
Fowling, Fishing, Navigating,
Rearing Children, Marriages and
Burials, and many other Curious
Particulars, never before Published. But like many eighteenthcentury authors, Kirk was a bit of
an embellisher and had no compunction about inventing or plagiarizing incidents to make his story
read better.
The bare bones of his life are
straightforward. He served with the
42nd and 77th Regiments in North
America during the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s Rebellion,
and criss-crossed North America
as a soldier. He spent some time as
a prisoner of the Pawnee Indians,
and became an accomplished
marksman, hunter, and tracker.
However, after publishing his memoirs in Ireland in 1775, Kirk faded
from the pages of history, just as
abruptly as he entered them.
The great strength of this edition is not simply the explanatory
notes that McCulloch and Todish
have sprinkled through Kirk’s text,
or the biographical sketches of the
major characters who pass in and
out of the narrative. They also carefully test the veracity of some of his
more implausible assertions, and
point out passages that are clearly
invented or were plagiarized from
other accounts. The result is not
simply a very useful account of a
soldier in mid-eighteenth-century
North America, but a fascinating
example of historical detective
work.
CA
*****
John Dixon, Magnificent But Not
War: The Battle of Ypres, 1915
(Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003),
$52.95, 224 pages, ISBN 1-884150020-X.

I

n common with other Western
Front battles of early 1915, the
Second Battle of Ypres has not en-
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joyed the same attention that historians lavish upon the Somme,
Passchendaele, and the Hundred
Days. Second Ypres has been left
largely to popular historians, and
John Dixon’s work is the latest to
appear since several Canadian accounts were published during the
1980s. An active member of the
South Wales Branch of the Western
Front Association, Dixon’s interest
in the battle is lifelong and his account is encyclopaedic. Unlike the
earlier Canadian narratives written
by George Cassar and Daniel
Dancocks, Dixon examines Second
Ypres from a broad BEF perspective. The participation of 1st Canadian Division features prominently,
but by no means dominates Dixon’s
version of the month-long battle.
Dixon sets the context with a
description of Western Front operations during the winter of 1914-15
and the British attack on Hill 60
(17-24 April) before venturing into
an exhaustive, day-by-day account
of operations from 22 April through
25 May. The chapters present a limited degree of analysis, but there is
relatively little fresh insight, due
largely to Dixon’s almost exclusive
reliance on secondary literature.
Much of the text is barely cited, and
most citations are drawn from already familiar sources. Dixon
raises interesting questions for Canadians regarding Brigadier-General Arthur Currie’s conduct, but
does not always follow through with
detailed explanations. Part of the
problem is that there is simply too
much material in this book. Tailoring a blow-by-blow narrative of more
than thirty days of active combat
operations to fit into a single volume was probably too ambitious
from the outset.
Of greatest significance is the
author’s suggestion that Second
Ypres was a prototype for the later
offensives of 1916-18, the attritional
battles in which neither side ever
appeared to secure its objectives.
This hypothesis will probably create some discomfort for Canadian
readers who are keen on the progressive learning-curve paradigm of
Great War operations. To compare
Second Ypres with the Somme or
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Passchendaele may seem outlandish at first, but in a field where tactical and operational changes have
been amplified at the expense of
attritional continuity, the question
demands further examination.
Dixon, unfortunately, did not have
the space to do so.
Although Canadian readers will
find little that is new in Magnificent But Not War, this volume
would be useful for anyone seeking a general-level understanding of
BEF operations in early 1915 or
planning a battlefield tour of the
Ypres Salient. The maps are not
quite comprehensive, but Dixon includes useful appendices concerning casualties, gallantry awards, and
the withdrawal to the Frezenberg
Line in May 1915. There is lots of
material on the human dimension
of the battle and, given the relative
dearth of scholarship dealing with
1915 operations, Dixon’s account is
most welcome.
AI
*****
Lilka Trzcinska-Croydon, The
Labyrinth of Dangerous Hours: A
Memoir of the Second World War
(Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004), $40.00, 152 pages,
ISBN 0-8020-3958-8.

T

May 1943. That was really the beginning of their horror. Lilka’s
mother died first, and then her sister was transferred to another
camp. Lilka herself was comparatively lucky, being put to work in
the camp offices on administrative
duties. Then there was a brutal
march to Ravensbruck concentration camp, transfer to BergenBelsen, and finally, in April 1945,
liberation.
Trzcinska-Croydon tells her
story with a mixture of prose and
poetry, and it is a very effective
combination. The fact that the narrative jumps around in time, from
her incarceration to the prewar period to her resistance work and
back again, doesn’t make it as disjointed as one might expect; on the
contrary, it is a technique that
makes one want to read on, to add
pieces to the puzzle. The fact that
her family was relatively fortunate
– her three siblings and father all
survived – doesn’t lessen the horror and tragedy inherent in this
very good memoir.
TV
*****
Michael S. Neiberg, Warfare in
World History (New York:
Routledge, 2001), $26.95 US paper,
114 pages, ISBN 0-41-522-955-3.

and progresses through the postclassical period (500-1450), the
emergence of gunpowder weapons
(1450-1776), nationalism and industrialism, the First World War,
the Second World War, and the Cold
War and beyond. Each of these
chapters is further sub-divided into
three sections which explore the
combatants and their motives, the
weapons they used, and the battles
in which they fought and died. Perhaps the most interesting part of
each chapter is the preface in which
Neiberg presents a case study of a
battle which illustrates many of the
themes of the period (ie. Dien Bien
Phu and the Cold War era).
Neiberg presents little new research; his goal was to provide a
brief synthesis of the history of
warfare and locate it within broader
themes in world history. He does a
very good job with the former but
the latter seems like a bit of an afterthought. He waits until his very
brief conclusion to assert that warfare is integral to four large historical themes: “epidemiology and germ
transmission; processes of diffusion and syncretism; the ‘rise of the
west’; and the industrial revolution”(100). This argument would
have been convincing had he made
it more central to his analysis, although the synthesis was the more
important component of this
project. Two other small concerns
came to mind as I read this book.
First, although each chapter concludes with a short but useful list
of suggestions for further reading,
citations are virtually non-existent
and the book even lacks a bibliography. In addition, Neiberg did a
good job of getting his facts right
(no easy task in a project of this
scope); however, in his chapter on
the Second World War he asserts
that the Prince of Wales and the
Repulse were sunk by “Japanese
carrier-based planes” (81) on 10
December 1941 when, in fact, they
were attacked by land-based bombers operating from bases in IndoChina. That said, Neiberg did ultimately draw the correct conclusion,
noting that this attack and that on
Pearl Harbor ensured that “surface

his memoir begins with the central event in the story of Lilka
Trzcinska-Croydon: the arrest of
her family by the Gestapo in March
1943 because of their involvement
in the activities of the Polish resistance. It is a disorienting opening,
as the reader knows little of the
family or its work in fighting the
Nazi Occupation, but it reflects what
must have been, to say the least, a
profoundly disorienting experience:
the arrival of the police in the middle of the night, to hustle family
members away to captivity. That the
episode is partly related in verse
makes the passage even more effective.
The family’s first stop was the
political prison at Pawiak, in the
district of Warsaw that the Nazis had
designated as the Jewish ghetto in
1940. They were separated there,
but went together to Auschwitz in

his book attempts to tackle a
mammoth task, namely, to survey the evolution of warfare over
almost 2500 years of history and
explore the influence of human conflict upon the fate of societies.
Michael S. Neiberg, Associate Professor of History at the United
States Air Force Academy, is constrained by the scope of his subject
as well as space limitations imposed by the editors of Routledge’s
Themes in World History series. He
handles these challenges masterfully and produces a readable and
useful little volume that could be
best described as providing “military history in a nutshell.”
To cover such a vast topic,
Neiberg uses a very clean, albeit
somewhat deterministic, framework of seven chapters. He begins
with the classical age (to 500 CE)
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ships thereafter acted without air
cover at their own risk” (81).
Professor Neiberg’s short book
does a very good job in a very small
package and would quite adequately
serve its intended purpose of providing an introduction to warfare
to university-level students. But its
brevity and readable style would
also make Warfare in World History attractive to anyone with a passing interest in the history of warfare but unwilling to jump in with
both feet and tackle all of the classic works.
DR
*****
A.M. Jack Hyatt and Nancy Geddes
Poole, Battle for Life: The History
of No. 10 Canadian Stationary
Hospital and No. 10 Canadian
General Hospital in Two World
Wars (Waterloo, ON: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2004), $24.00
paper, 209 pages, ISBN 0-96887506-8.

A

fter going for decades without
getting a new published history
of a military hospital, we suddenly
have two: Michel Litalien’s account
of the French-Canadian hospital
units of the First World War, reviewed in the last supplement, and
now Hyatt and Poole’s Battle for
Life.
In both wars, The University of
Western Ontario hospital was something of a late starter. After making
a number of advances to military
authorities, the university’s offer to
provide a stationary hospital was
finally accepted in April 1916. By
the same token, it was July 1942
before 10 CGH was authorized (only
later was it adopted by The University of Western Ontario). Nevertheless, both provided care to a huge
number of patients: 10 Stationary
admitted some 14,000 patients in
1918 alone, while 10 CGH cared for
over 21,000 between August 1944
(when it opened for the first time
in France) and July 1945, when it
stopped accepting patients.
Hyatt, as befitting a military
historian, is much more interested
in the military history of the unit,

and provides some fascinating
insights through his narrative. For
example, he discusses the reluctance of doctors to classify wounded
soldiers as Category A, meaning
they would be shipped back to the
front, even though there was a good
deal of pressure to do so from military authorities. Hyatt’s statistics in
this regard are instructive. Between
January and October 1918, the percentage of admitted soldiers who
were eventually classed as Category
A was never higher than 7%. But
beginning in November 1918, when
soldiers returned to their units
would no longer be facing enemy
fire, Category A classifications
jumped dramatically, eventually
reaching over 21%. Clearly, the
medical staff were reluctant to return men to the trenches after they
had done their bit and been
wounded. The situation calls to
mind the slogan of a wartime organization for wounded soldiers in
Britain: “Every man once before any
man twice.”
Nancy Geddes Poole writes
more a social history of the hospital, and has some particularly interesting things to say about the
families of the staff. As the daughter of one of the hospital’s senior
doctors, she had the advantage of
being able to interview former members of 10 CGH and their families,
and so has added many personal
recollections to her narrative. Especially touching are the reflections
of the children of the medical staff,
who faced the same situation as
thousands of other children: having to say goodbye to a dearly loved
father, then in three or four years
getting back a man who was in some
ways a stranger.
The comparative aspect of the
book works well: we can see the
improvements that were made to
the practices of handling patients
between the First World War and
the Second. The one constant,
though, was the desire of all personnel to provide the best possible
treatment to the patients who came
under their care.
KS
*****
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Patrick Bouvier, Déserteurs et
insoumis: Les Canadiens français
et la justice militaire (1914-1918)
(Outremont: Athéna Éditions,
2003), $14.95 paper, 152 pages,
ISBN 2-922865-19-3.

A

side from short works by
Desmond Morton and Andrew
Godefroy, very little has been written about indiscipline in the ranks
of the Canadian Expeditionary
Force. Bouvier attempts to fill this
gap by looking at French-Canadian
soldiers who, as any good English
Canadian would have told you in
1916, were all deserters who just
hadn’t had the opportunity to desert
yet.
Beginning with chapters on the
historiography of desertion and the
operation of the various laws covering military service during the
First World War, he gets to the core
of the study in two chapters on defaulters and deserters. In the first
group, Bouvier uses the reports on
the operation of the Military Service Act to draw conclusions about
the regional disposition of defaulters. For deserters, he has used the
nominal index of courts martial to
find 148 individuals who, according to their name, residence, and
religion, were likely to be French
Canadian. Bouvier fully admits the
potential problems with this methodology – there are plenty of French
Canadians with English names – but
it is surely the only reasonable way
to approach this kind of study. Using this sample group, he then embarks upon an analysis of this group
from a socio-demographic standpoint: their age, marital status,
employment, and other factors.
It is a useful methodology, and
one that might well be applied on a
broader basis. Given the availability of the CEF records that Bouvier
has used, any number of variations
on this study could be attempted.
With this, we might finally get away
from the hoary generalizations that
have characterized perceptions of
indiscipline since the First World
War.
JFV
*****
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Ted Barris, Juno: Canadians at
D-Day June 6, 1944 (Toronto:
Thomas Allen Publishers, 2004),
$34.95, 321 pages, ISBN 0-88762133-3.

ublishers and authors love anniversaries. Topics and issues
that disappear from the public consciousness magically surface when
a landmark date rolls around, especially if it is a round number - 5,
10, 25 years, etc. The 60th anniversary of the D-Day landings in
Normandy brought a flood of books
commemorating that decisive campaign in the summer of 1944.
The focus of this crop of books
is on the participants’ stories. Each
passing year witnesses the loss of
more veterans and it is crucial that
their stories be collected and told
while the opportunity still exists.
One of the first releases was Ted
Barris’ Juno: Canadians at D-Day
June 6, 1944. Barris tells the story
of the Canadian experience at Juno
in the voices of the men who were
there: young farmers from Manitoba and Saskatchewan, fresh-faced
high school graduates from Ontario, workers from mines and factories in the Maritimes and eager
recruits from Quebec and Newfoundland. This book, written in
the style of Stephen Ambrose, is
filled with stories and anecdotes of
the Canadians who landed in France
on D-Day. It details their experiences while training for the big day,
as they approach the French coastline, as well as their first introduc-

tions to combat. Some of the stories are humorous. Richard
Rohmer, a boyish-looking 20-yearold fighter pilot recounts the time
he met George Patton, the famous
American general. Patton paused in
front of Rohmer while conducting
an inspection of his squadron.
“‘Boy,’ Patton had demanded,
‘how old are you?’
“‘I’m twenty, sir’ Rohmer replied proudly.
“The general pointed up at the
looming nose of the Mustang towering over Rohmer’s youthful
frame.
“‘Do you fly that goddam
airplane.’
“‘Yes, sir.’
“With that the general dropped
his arm and blurted out, ‘Son of a
bitch,’ and turned away shaking his
head.”
Often, however, the stories are
more poignant. Tony Burns served
with a Canadian medical unit and
described his experiences treating
wounded soldiers. “The saddest
head wounds were the ones in which
the face and head were sprayed with
tiny pellets....To my deep surprise,
when the wounded soldiers closed
their eyes, they sobbed and asked
for their mothers.”
Fred Barnard landed among
the first wave of troops with the
Queen’s Own Rifles at Bernièressur-Mer. With him in the landing
craft were his younger brother,
Donald, and a childhood friend,
Gordon Arthur. When the ramp
went down, they all rushed out and
immediately fell into four feet of
water. There were explosions and
chaos all around. Fred ran by a
young 19-year-old private whose
belly had been ripped open by
shrapnel. As he looked for a safe
refuge, Fred saw that his chum
Gord had made it to some cover.
“‘Then I saw my brother
Don...lying on his back as if he was
asleep,’ Barnard said. ‘There was
just a black hole in his uniform
right in the middle of his chest. No
blood. He must have died instantly.’”
There was nothing that Fred
could do for his brother. And he
couldn’t even take the luxury of
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Hugh Brewster, On Juno Beach:
Canada’s
D-Day
Heroes
(Markham: Scholastic Canada Ltd,
2004), $10.99 paper, 48 pages, ISBN
0-439-96728-7.
Lance Goddard, D-Day Juno
Beach: Canada’s 24 Hours of Destiny (Toronto: Dundurn, 2004),
$29.99 paper, 256 pages, ISBN 155002-492-0.
Mark Zuehlke, Juno Beach: Canada’s D-Day Victory: June 6, 1944
(Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre,
2004), $35.00, 414 pages, ISBN 155365-050-6.
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grieving for him as his unit still had
to get on with the task of breaking
through Hitler’s Atlantic Wall. It
wasn’t until much later that Fred
had time to come to terms with what
happened.
Barris’ book contains dozens
of stories that capture the feelings,
emotions and reactions of Canadian
soldiers, sailors and airman as they
prepared for and participated in
what General Erwin Rommel
called, “The Longest Day.” You won’t
find any better book that captures
the Canadian experience at “the
sharp end.” However, Barris fails
to give the reader a sense of the big
picture. This is fine for readers who
have a solid grounding in the history of D-Day, but casual readers
will find themselves lost in the detail, trying to understand how the
various vignettes fit together. The
maps contained in this book are inadequate. It is impossible to read
and understand military history
without good maps, and a detailed
book of this nature requires equally
fine maps. The maps that are included are not helped by the fact
that they are printed across the gutter of the book, thus losing a strip
of detail from the centre.
Overall, Juno is a welcome addition to the literature of the Canadian military in the Second World
War. It does not contain any new
information about the D-Day landings (the sensationalist dust-jacket
claims do the book a grave disservice), but it is a well-written, very
readable account of an important
day in Canadian history.
A number of the other releases
focussed on the Canadian role on
D-Day.
On Juno Beach: Canada’s DDay Heroes by Hugh Brewster is a
short book directed at a grade
school audience. It is a very handsome book that combines photographs (both historic and modern)
with good maps and a brief text that
explains the Canadian role on DDay. Intertwined with the history are
brief portraits of Canadians who
participated in the landings.
Though this book is history at its
simplest, it is an excellent introduction to a complicated topic. It is
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essential that young generations
learn about the sacrifices that
helped to create the freedom we enjoy today. Parents would be well advised to share this book with their
children.
D-Day Juno Beach: Canada’s
24 Hours of Destiny by Lance
Goddard is the companion to a television documentary that was produced to commemorate the 60th
anniversary of D-Day. It utilizes
personal interviews organized on an
hour-by-hour basis to tell the Canadian story on D-Day. It contains
the remembrances of over 30 men
who played a role on that historic
day. Typical of the book are the
comments of Jim Parks, who
landed with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Recounting the death of his
comrades during his green regiment’s introduction to battle, he
commented, “You waited so long to
die so fast.” Among the other interviewees are Doug Barrie and August Herchenratter, who landed with
the Highland Light Infantry and Don
Learmont, who came ashore with
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders.
All three men landed on the afternoon of D-Day with the reserve brigade, and thus missed the initial
landings, but they offer poignant descriptions of the scenes that greeted
them as they arrived in France. After D-Day they were in the thick of
the fighting to breakout of the Normandy bridgehead.
Juno Beach: Canada’s D-Day
Victory: June 6, 1944 by Mark
Zuehlke covers the story of Canadian troops on D-Day, beginning
with their training in England.
Zuehlke has previously written a
three-volume history of the Canadian army in Italy during the Second World War. This book follows
the same format - it is rich in narrative detail, but light in analysis.
Zuehlke does a much better job setting out the context in which the
Canadians fought than did Barris
and overall, it is a much more readable account of Canada’s ‘Longest
Day.’
MB
*****

Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest
of France in 1870-1871 (London:
Cambridge University Press, 2003),
$29.95 paper, 337 pages, ISBN 052-1617-43-X.

A

nyone who has ever read a disappointing book knows how little dust jacket praise can be trusted.
Every now and again, however, a
book can surprise, living up to every
glowing review. Such is the case
with Geoffrey Wawro’s The FrancoPrussian War; even Sir Michael
Howard gave accolades – a remarkable fact given that his book of the
same name had been the authoritative work in the field for over forty
years. Howard’s book is excellent,
but Wawro’s is so much fun to read
that there is no reason to go any
further.
Wawro combines a page-turning narrative with enormous
amounts of research, drawing on
archives from five countries as well
as his previous work on The
Austro-Prussian War (1996). His
sources go beyond the usual political-strategic dossiers and into the
human interest side of soldiers’
personal papers and diaries, offering memorable quotes and colour,
and bringing life to a story known
superficially to many, but in depth
to too few.
The history of the Franco-Prussian War is surrounded by a healthy
dose of stereotypes of French incompetence, Prussian dominance,
and black-and-white conclusions.
Wawro re-examines such prejudices to show where the French were
superior, and where Prussia was
lucky even though foolish, outkitted and out-classed, and not even
terribly Prussian after all. Wawro
is sensitive to current trends in
examining ethnic identities, showing that the “Prussians” were in fact
also Bavarian, Hessian, and
Badenese – both politically, and in
their own hearts and minds. The
Franco-Prussian War skilfully integrates these elements into the
greater political context, though in
the end, the highest praise is reserved for the quality of analysis.
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Wawro does well what too few military histories do: he applies
Clausewitz to narrative history. On
these pages, such gems as “Battle is
slaughter – if you shy away from it,
someone will come along with a
sharp sword and hack off your
arms” (114) appear so effortlessly
as to bring a new appreciation for
mid-nineteenth-century European
warfare.
The only complaint possible
(and a very minor one at that) is that
the maps are more confusing than
helpful, though there are many of
them. The battle maps are too small
to allow the reader to properly situate more obscure places like
Froeschwiller or Spicheren in Alsace, and the larger scale maps are
somewhat vague and selective. Nevertheless, Wawro has produced a
tremendous book. He lets the reader
remember that this war ushered in
the birth of modern Germany, and
the French Third Republic – “the
Whore” to many Frenchmen on the
eve of a bigger war forty years later
– all while giving a careful explanation of the strategies, tactics, and
blood-and-guts reality for the men
in the field. A masterful military
history, The Franco-Prussian War
is an excellent read for professionals and interested public alike.
SC
*****
Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley
Phillips Newton, To Command the
Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), $24.95 paper, 328
pages, ISBN 1-58834-044-9.

T

he level of Allied air superiority over the beaches of Normandy has become almost legendary
– both sides agreed that Allied aircraft could operate over the beachhead with virtual impunity. As
McFarland and Newton describe in
this re-issue of a book originally
published over a decade ago, this
was achieved only after two years
of hard slogging. Even then, mistakes by the German command
were necessary for Eisenhower’s
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promise to his troops – “If you see
fighting aircraft over you, they will
be ours” (239) – to be realized.
Luftwaffe fighters were not released
to deal with the invasion until too
late. By the time they started to
move towards Normandy, Allied
bombers had destroyed many of
their intended airfields, and had
also disrupted the transportation
networks that they were counting
on to move up ground crews and
spare parts.
The Luftwaffe had also been on
the losing end of a war of attrition;
despite the losses sustained by their
daylight bombing force, American
fighter pilots proved to be remarkably adept at destroying German
fighters. They were never as lethal
as their own claims suggested, and
victory claims by the 8th Air Force
were sometimes laughably exaggerated – on 11 January 1944, the 8th
claimed 259 kills, while the average of figures taken from three different German sources yields a loss
of just 38 aircraft – but the end result was indisputable: by the summer of 1944, there simply were not
enough German aircraft and pilots
left to mount a significant challenge
to the Allied threat in the air. As
McFarland and Newton argue, Big
Week in February 1944, when Allied air units engaged in a war of
attrition against the Luftwaffe, had
as much to do with achieving air
superiority over the beaches of
Normandy as anything.
BL

he Last Good War is an appropriate title for a book on Canada’s role in the Second World War.
Sixty years after the end of the war,
people still look back on that period with a certain fondness. There
is no doubt that it was a nasty, ugly
war, but it was a war fought for the
best of reasons, against what

Winston Churchill called, “a monstrous tyranny never surpassed in
the dark and lamentable catalogue
of human crime.” This year saw the
60th anniversary of the end of the
Second World War in Europe.
There has been much rejoicing over
the role played by the Canadian
army in liberating Holland. But,
this was just one aspect of a war
that lasted six years and cost millions of lives around the world,
including over 40,000 Canadians
who died for the cause. The Last
Good War written by J.L.
Granatstein, the former director of
the Canadian War Museum, is a welcome addition to the many books
being released to coincide with the
anniversary. This book examines
Canada’s contribution to the Allied
cause in the Second World War.
Granatstein sheds light on all aspects of Canada’s war effort, on
land, at sea, in the air and on the
home front, with a narrative text that
is enriched with numerous firstperson accounts from the participants. The real strength of this
book lies with its illustrations. In
addition to over 150 black and
white photographs, The Last Good
War features many of the unknown
gems from the war art collection of
the Canadian War Museum. This
collection, which totals nearly
13,000 images, finally has worthy
home in the new Canadian War
Museum. The public galleries showcase many of these unparalleled
works. However, those who can’t
make it to Ottawa need look no further than Granatstein’s book.
Early in the book, Granatstein
explores the reasons Canada went
to war. In 1939 Canada was a small
country still living in the shadow
of the British Empire. However,
when the call for war came in September, Canada made its own, conscious decision to go to war.
Granatstein quotes the words of
Stephen Leacock, the famous Canadian humourist. Writing for an
American magazine in June 1939,
Leacock opined: “If you asked any
Canadian, ‘Do you have to go to war
if England does?,’ he’d answer at
once, ‘Oh, no.’ If you then said,
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*****
J.L. Granatstein, The Last Good
War: An Illustrated History of
Canada in the Second World War,
1939-1945 (Toronto: Douglas and
McIntyre, 2005), $55.00, 242 pages
ISBN 1-55054-913-8.
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‘Would you go to war if England
does?,’ he’d answer, ‘Oh, yes.’ And
if you asked, ‘Why?,’ he would say,
reflectively, ‘Well, you see, we’d have
to,’” Leacock had it exactly right.”
From here, Granatstein provides an
overview of Canada during the Second World War. The early low points
of Hong Kong and Dieppe are covered, as well as the later success
during D-Day and the campaigns in
Normandy and Northwest Europe.
Granatstein has a knack for
bringing the past to life through insightful first-person accounts. We
are right there on the home front,
“‘I had no memory whatsoever of
my father,’ who had enlisted early,
was wounded at Dieppe and spent
the rest of the war as a prisoner. ‘I
only knew what he looked like from
the pictures my mother showed
me.’” In the air, “I heard a series of
bangs-like thunderclaps...Suddenly
the plane went into a spin and when
I was conscious again, I was in my
chute which was open but had 3 panels on fire...” And in the concentration camps, “I have just seen Belsen
and I am ashamed....Over the whole
place is the still of death and the
sweet sickly scent of human flesh.”
The Last Good War is a wellwritten, illustrated account of Canada’s role in the Second World War
that would be a good addition to
any library.
MB
*****
Richard Gimblett, Operation
Apollo: The Golden Age of the
Canadian Navy in the War
Against Terrorism (Ottawa: Magic
Light Publishing, 2004), $24.95
paper, 160 pages, ISBN 1-89467316-6.

U

pon seeing this book, my first
instinct was to be confused by
its subtitle. Did the Golden Age of
the Canadian Navy occur during the
war against terrorism (and not during the Second World War or the
Korean War, as many have assumed), or was there one period
that might be considered the Golden
Age of the Canadian Navy’s involvement in the war against terrorism?
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We eventually learn that 1995
marked the beginning of the navy’s
Golden Age: “Forget the ‘rustbucket’ image of the 1980s – today
Canada possesses a world-class
navy” (36). Or, as force commander
Commodore Eric Lehre put it,
“Ours is the best medium power
navy in the world” (152).
There is no question that Operation Apollo was an immense undertaking for the Canadian Navy,
for it involved sixteen ships and
4100 personnel, who did all that
could be asked of them and more.
But after reading this authorized
but not official account (the distinction is made quite clear in the foreword), the novice who knows nothing else about Canadian defence
policy could be forgiven for imagining that the Canadian Navy is in

fine shape, has all the funding and
equipment it needs, and is the envy
of middle powers around the
world. To cite just one example, we
learn that “Four diesel-electric Victoria-class submarines acquired
from the Royal Navy (ex-Upholderclass) are presently being converted
to Canadian standards and will ensure the continuation of a capability for stealthy underwater surveillance and attack” (36) – assuming,
of course, that they can ever be
made seaworthy.
Only at the end of the book are
any concerns about the state of the
Canadian Forces raised: command
and control destroyers are reaching the end of their operational life,
with no plans to replace them; Fleet
Maintenance Facilities can’t support
a wartime operational pace; re-

placement of replenishment ships
is long overdue; and there has been
no funding for the mid-life extension program for our frigates. In
short, there is a very real possibility that, when the next emergency
arises, the Canadian Navy may not
have the capability to respond.
This is a fine book, sumptuously illustrated and a great tribute to the men and women of our
navy, who never get the credit they
deserve. But the military’s case for
higher defence funding would have
been better served if the equipment
issues facing the Canadian Navy had
been given prominence at the beginning of the book, rather than
being relegated to the last page.
JFV

Briefly Noted
Stephen J. Lee, The Thirty Years
War (New York: Routledge, 2003),
$19.95 paper, 73 pages, ISBN 0-41506027-3.

T

he Lancaster Pamphlet series is
intended to provide concise
and up-to-date treatments of major
historical topics covered in introductory university-level courses.
This also makes them ideal for the
writer who needs a solid historical
account for context, or for the lecturer who needs to swot up on a
subject quickly. Lee provides short,
succinct summaries of thematic aspects of the war: a chronological
narrative, the participants and their
motives, the personalities involved,
the religious issues, major military
developments, the impact of the war
on society and the economy, and the
Peace of Westphalia that brought the

conflict to a conclusion. In addition,
there is an extensive range of maps,
some contemporary illustrations,
and a short list of selected readings. The entire package is well
organized, reader-friendly, and affordable. Most importantly, in the
hour or so spent reading it, you can
gain an understanding of one of the
most complex conflicts in early
modern European history.
*****
Yves Tremblay, Roch Legault, and
Jean Lemarre, eds., L’éducation et
les
militaires
canadiens
(Outremont: Athéna Éditions,
2004), $19.95 paper, 263 pages,
ISBN 2-922865-24-X.

T

his collection of new and previously published articles covers all aspects of military educa-
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tion in Canada (a number also provide the comparative element by
looking at the subject in other countries). Some of Canada’s best military historians are represented:
Claude Beauregard (“Les enjeux de
la connaissance et les Forces
canadiennes”); Serge Bernier on the
history of Le Collège militaire
royale de Saint- Jean; Réné
Chartrand (“Les élèves-officiers au
Canada de 1685 1760”); Allan English on the military culture and professional education in the military;
Steve Harris on professionalization
in the militia; and Desmond
Morton on officer education. Yves
Tremblay’s chronology of military
education is very useful; a collective bibliography would have been
a good addition to this otherwise
excellent collection.
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